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F

or almost as long as the systematic study of human behavior has
been a distinct field of scholarly endeavor, a dispute has been
carried on between the proponents of two opposite points of
view. On the one side are those who are convinced that, since human
behavior is a natural phenomenon, no less natural than phenomena
associated with energy and animate and inanimate matter, the same
fundamental scientific attitudes and ways of constructing and testing
theories should prove fruitful in the study of this part of nature as in the
areas of what are known as the natural sciences. Members of this group
are called nomological social scientists because they accept the view that
social phenomena can be accounted for within a framework of rules. On
the other side are the antinomological social scientists, who are just as
certain there is something unique in human behavior which is inaccessible to the methods of science.
Robert Wolfson received his ondergraduate and graduate degrees from the
During the two and a half centuries that this debate has been carried
University of Chicago, including the
on (from approximately the mid-seventeenth century to the present),
Ph.D. in economics. He has taught at
Vanderbilt, Michigan State, and
many attempts have been made by each camp to demonstrate the
Washington (St. Louis ) universities, as
correctness
of its position. Entire fields of study have developed
well as U.C.L.A. and the University of
Chicago. He has also held a number of
(anthropology, economics, history, political science, psychology, sociresearch positions. Since 1966 Dr.
Wolfson has been Professor of ology); and while in each of these fields the nomological and antiEconomics in the Maxwell School at
nomological viewpoints have almost always been in contention, usually
Syracuse University.
one or the other has been dominant. Among economists, for example,
with the exception of German economists prior to 1950, the view of the
nomological social scientists has prevailed; until recently, among
political scientists the antinomological social scientists have held sway.
This article is a report of work done by
But the fight still goes on.
the author and his colleagues, Robert B.
One thing is clear: Up to this time neither side has demonstrated the
Barrett and Richard S. Rudner. A
shorter version appeared in Synthi!Se 46
validity of its position. For nomological social scientists, demonstration
(1981): 455-465. The author is grateful
of
successful scientific theories of social phenomena, tightly logically
to Donald T Campbell, Barry Glassner,
and Alexander Rosenberg for their
constructed and empirically tested, would constitute support of their
careful reading and helpful comments;
position. But this demonstration has yet to be given. In economics and
and to the editors of Syracuse Scholar,
psychology, the two most rigorous and quantitative of the human
who made many useful suggestions.
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sciences, there are examples of tightly constructed mathematical or
logical theoretical structures; however, they are built of concepts that do
not refer to empirical matter in such a fashion as to permit empirical
test. Moreover, in these two fields there are examples of empirical
studies which reveal elaborate empirical regularities in a thoroughly
systematic fashion. In other human sciences there have been very few
empirical regularities discovered and very few attempts to account for
such as have been found . Thus in the social sciences we find neither the
construction nor the testing of powerful, tight logical structures of
theoretical statements that have significant empirical content.
A frequently expressed concern of antinomological social scientists,
such as Peter Winch, 1 is that important subtleties of meaning cannot
possibly be specified in a formal system. Nomological social scientists
claim that, to the contrary, subtle distinctions can be more readily
drawn in a definitional system than in a system in which the terms are
not plainly defined. Furthermore, distinctions in a definitional system
are clear and precise because the components of the terms are visible
rather than murkily stated, as is now generally the case. Winch's argument amounts, in essence, to the claim that understanding of social
phenomena depends entirely on experiencing them, and that the
responsibility of the social analyst is to be able to reproduce the phenomena. Thus, as Rudner has put it, "Winch's argument commits a
rather subtle form of the 'reproductive fallacy."' 2 Winch's argument,
when unpacked, implies ruling out all means except experience (especially scientific and logical means) of gaining knowledge about social
phenomena. This claim is rejected by nomological social scientists.
The case against the possibility of a science of human behavior would
be made by the permanent failure of the nomological social scientists.
That is, only with a proof of the impossibility of a scientific treatment
can the antinomological social scientists' position be sustained
thoroughly. This proof has not been offered, and no such proof appears
to be in sight. And so the matter is still open.

1. Peter Winch, Th e Idea of a Social
Science and Its Relation t o Philosophy
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1958).

2. R.S. Rudner, The Philosophy of
Social Science, Prentice-Hall Found ations of Philosophy (Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 83.

T

his paper is an account of an attempt by two philosophers (the
late Richard S. Rudner and Robert B. Barrett) and an economist (this writer), all nomological social scientists, to make an
approach to the problem. The approach rests on the widely held view of
a scientific theory as a linguistic entity. In this view a scientific theory is
understood to consist of a set of two sorts of statements about a group of
phenomena. The first sort are statements assumed to be true but not
empirically tested. These statements are called postulates, or axioms.
The second sort are statements which follow logically from the axioms.
That is, they are implied by, or are deduced from, the axioms. These are
called theorems.
For any reasonably rich set of axioms the total number of significantly distinct theorems which may be implied can be immense. Empirical test of a scientific theory as a linguistic entity can be carried out
by attempting to verify that all those theorems which are known, and
whose testing is feasible (assuming that the number of such theorems is
not zero), are not inconsistent with observable data . If they pass this
test, then the theory is supported and normally is accepted. If any of the
known and testable theorems of the theory are not sustained, then so
long as the scientific community trusts the test, the theory may be called
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into question, dropped, or revised and tested again. Acceptance of a
theory at a given time does not constitute a basis for its uncritical acceptance for all time thereafter. It is the hallmark of empirical science that
all theories are, at all times, candidates for rejection or revision. Tests of
theorems which were earlier untestable, as well as the discovery of (or
new understanding of) phenomena hitherto unknown or understood
differently, are all events which can lead to the questioning of hitherto
accepted theories .
Since the components of this linguistic entity (the scientific theory)
are statements, they must be constructed of terms. It is with terms that
this enterprise is concerned. In effect, what my colleagues and I have
begun to do is to construct a technical dictionary of terms out of which
theories of the social sciences can be built. These terms are of two
general sorts : The first are called primitives. These are not defined, but
their meaning or content is clarified by example, by ostension (i.e.,
demonstratively) . The second sort are the definitions, which are constructed in a very formal logical fashion. The building blocks of these
definitions are the primitives and logical operators such as and, or, not,
and there exists a - -; plus terms already defined in the field of
investigation; as well as terms which are primitives in, or defined in,
other fields such as logic, mathematics, or physics.
Richard Rudner and I met toward the end of 1956, shortly after we
had both come to Michigan State University as young faculty members,
he in philosophy and I in economics. We soon realized that we shared
many intellectual attitudes and concerns, which, along with our complementary abilities, offered a basis for interesting work together.
In the spring of 1958 we began to ask ourselves why is was that the
social sciences had not yet shown more signs of success as a scientific
enterprise. Eventually we concluded that, while there were probably
other factors involved, surely one had to do with the nature of the
lexicon in which the social sciences-all of them-were conducted.

I

3. P.W. Bridgman, Dimensional
A naly sis (New Haven, Conn.: Yale
University Press, 1922).
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n each social science area, the lexicon consists of the natural language (i.e., the informal or everyday language) plus a sprinkling of
technical terminology defined as in an ordinary dictionary. There
is some variation among fields as to the extent to which mathematical
notation and modeling are used. But the mathematics, whatever the
extent of it, involves symbols whose interpretations are made in terms
of the natural language.
These social science lexicons did not then, and still do not, display any
of the definitional structure which we see in classical mechanics-and
which has now become part of chemistry and portions of biology. As
Bridgman has so clearly shown, all terms in classical mechanics, apart
from names and mathematical terms, can in principle be constructed
from a primitive base (i.e., a set of primitives) consisting of three
terms: mass, length, and time.3 One consequence of this is that there are
only three terms in classical mechanics that are clarified primarily by
ostension rather than defined. Thus all other terms are so related to
those three primitive terms, and to each other through the primitives,
that the process of measurement of each of the defined terms is logically
related to the process of measurement of each of the three primitivesand thus through them to the process of measurement of all the others.
This approach leads to greater clarity of meaning and less circularity of

3
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definition than is displayed in statements constructed of terms defined
as in a natural-language dictionary.
These properties are characteristic of the lexicon of classical
mechanics, but they are not found in the lexicon of any of the so:ial
sciences. There we find that successive uses of the same term by •ne
speaker or writer involve slightly different meanings; the meani gs
differ even more if the terms are used by different speakers or writt ·s.
Measurement of one concept is not systematically related, through
definitional connection, to that of another. We also find vast umbras
and penumbras of unclarity. As Rudner and I rehearsed this state of
affairs, we decided to devise a constructional framework for such a
system of definitions-a framework appropriate for some field of the
social sciences. 4 In the summer of 1958 and during the subsequent year,
we developed our first set of definitions, based on nine primitive terms.
The area on which we decided to focus was the theory of organizational behavior. This was a political as well as substantive decision. Our
reasons were, first, that organizational behavior was a field with which
we were both familiar. Second, the field had been subjected to a fair
amount of formal or quasi-formal analysis. Third, well-entrenched
institutional interests and deep organizational commitments to
particular methods were weaker in this area than in some others.
It was our belief (since borne out repeatedly by experience) that a
proposal to adopt entirely new and strange methods and concepts
would be resisted by practitioners in any field. New terms and methods
are usually resisted until it becomes clear that their introduction may aid
in the solution of an unsolved problem. Moreover, we expected that the
vigor of such resistance would be in direct proportion to the degree of
confidence of practitioners as to the good scientific standing of the field .
Thus microeconomic theory, operant conditioning theory, learning
theory, and demographic theory were ruled out as fields in which to
introduce our proposals. Organizational behavior theory was territory
that had been worked, but it was not one of the major demarcated areas
of the social sciences. There were few departments of organizational
behavior, few organizations or journals heavily committed to the field.
It appeared then to be a good candidate for our effort, and it still seems
so.

4. "The definitions of an uninterpreted
symbolic system serve as mere conventions of notational interchangeability.
... In a constructional system, however,
most of the definitions are introduced
for explanatory purposes. They may be
arbitrary in the sense that they present
a choice among alternative definientia
(definitions ); but whatever the choice
... the definiendum (what is defined)
... is .. . a familiar meaningful term. .
A constructional definition is correct.
if the range of application of its
definiens is the same as that of its
definiendum" [emphasis added].
N. Goodman, The Structure of Appear·
ance, 3d ed. (Dordrecht, Holland, and
Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Co.,
1977 ), p. 3.

G

iven this decision, one question quickly arises: What are the
terms to be defined? That is, what are the terms of which
theories of organizational behavior, if there are any, are constructed? Indeed, our first concern was to look into the status of
organization theory.
March and Simon begin their landmark survey of the field with the
following paragraph:
This book is about the theory of formal organizations. It is easier,
and probably more useful, to give examples of formal organizations than to define the term. The United States Steel Corporation is a formal organization; so is the Red Cross, the corner
grocery store, the New York State Highway Department. The
latter organization is, of course, part of a larger one-the New
York State Government. But for present purposes we need not
trouble ourselves about the precise boundaries to be drawn
around an organization or the exact distinction between an

https://surface.syr.edu/suscholar/vol3/iss1/14
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5. James G. March and Herbert A.
Simon, Or[!,anizations (New York:
Wiley, 1958), p. l.

6. In this respect there is no significant
difference between the organization
theory literature of today and that of
1958.

7. March and Simon, Or[!,anizations,
p. 8.
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"organization " and a "nonorganization." We are dealing with
empirical phenomena, and the world has an uncomfortable way
of not permitting itself to be fitted into clean classifications. 5
It is of interest to note that March and Simon, in this paragraph,
express a much less sanguine view of the prospects for the conduct of
nomological social sciences than they do elsewhere (especially Simon).
Certainly their position is quite different from the one taken in this
article. But what is particularly interesting in the quoted paragraph is
the authors' assessment in 1958 of the definitional status of organization.6
One important feature of their book, and the primary reason for
referring to it here, is that it is a propositional inventory of organization
theories. This inventory is organized, as the authors tell us, around
three groupings of propositions:
1. Propositions assuming that organization members ... are
primarily passive instruments .. . .
2. Propositions assuming that members bring to their organizations attitudes, values and goals; that they have to be motivated or
induced to participate in the system of organizational behavior;
that there is incomplete parallelism between their personal goals
and organization goals, and that . .. goal conflicts . .. make power
phenomena, attitudes and morale internally important . . ..
3. Propositions assuming that organization members are decision makers . . . and that perception ... is . . . central to the
explanation of behavior in organizations. 7
Propositions of the first sort are characteristic of the structural
approach to organization theory (e.g., the scientific management
theories of F. W. Taylor, Max Weber's theory of bureaucracy). Those of
the second sort are characteristic of motivational approaches (e.g., the
Hawthorne studies, the Michigan group-dynamics research) . Those of
the third variety are characteristic of the decision-making approach
(e.g., management science, organizational decision-making studies) .
What was of special interest to us in the March and Simon work was
the critical concepts in the sentences quoted-most especially those
which the authors emphasized typographically. Other concepts were
important as well, including some which were implicit in the authors'
language such as features of organization structure, attitudes, values,
goals, organizational goals, personal goals, decision, decision maker,
perception, organization member, behavior, conflict, cooperation, and
organization itself.

T

hese concepts form a central core of notions to be found in all
organization theories. My colleague and I understood their
definition to be the central task in the construction of a system
of definitions for organization theory.
But since these terms were used by a variety of organization theories,
how could we be sure that they were always used in the same way-that
they were to be understood in the same way by the reader? Indeed, our
initial interest in this problem was, in part, motivated by the conviction
that one of the troubles with social sciences was precisely this-that the
same terms were, on different occasions, used differently. How could
we deal with this problem of different intended meanings or, in the
absence of clear intention, different loose understandings? Our
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approach has been to construct for each term a general definition which
seems to cover most understandings (that is, a definition which covers
far more territory than does any one usage) and then to apply qualifications to it in a careful, explicit fashion. Thus particular intended
meanings were arrived at by a process of reduction of coverage through
qualification.
These were the nine primitives we used: time slice, producer or potential producer of, mechanical class, physical class, morphological class,
functional class, event, probability, and belief. Of these, the first six
were borrowed from work by C. West Churchman and Russell Ackoff,
two philosophers who attempted in the 1940s to formulate a defi nitional system for the field of personality psychology. 8 The work that
Rudner and I did in 1958 and 1959 resulted in the appearance of a paper
that incorporated a set of definitions..,-the primitives plus 100 definitions in four groups: preliminary (21 definitions), decision behavior
(26 definitions), cooperation and conflict (21 definitions), and organization (32 definitions) .9
This set of definitions was never applied to any body of theoretical
discourse, and, after the publication of this paper, events interfered for
a while with further activity. But in the summer of 1964, Rudner and I
were able to begin work again. Rudner then suggested that we could
profit from the involvement of Robert Barrett, his colleague in the
Philosophy _Department at Washington University. The three of us
worked intensively together during the summers of 1964 and 1965, and
on and off since then.

8. C.W. Churchman and R.L. Ackoff,
""Psychologistics,"" mimeographed
(University of Pennsylvania, 1947); and
C.W. Churchman, ""An Experimental
Definition o f Personality,"" Philosophy
of Science 14 ( 1947): 304-332.
9. R.S. Rudner and R.J. Wolfson,
""Notes on a Constructio nal Framework
for a Theory of Organizational DecisionMaking," in Decisions, Values and
Groups (London: Pergamon Press,

1962), 2:371-409.

A

the beginning of this three-way collaboration we gave much
thought to the differences between the nominalist and
Platonist approaches to logic to which Nelson Goodman
10
points. Goodman asserts that severe ontological problems arise from
the fact that, for purposes of constructing formal existential statements, Platonists (i.e., users of the calculus of classes) do not discriminate between individuals, classes of individuals, classes of classes, and
so forth:
Use of the calculus of classes, once we have admitted any individuals at all, opens the door to all classes, classes of classes, etc., of
those individuals, and so may import, in addition to the individuals purposely admitted by our choice of the special primitives,
an infinite multitude of other entities that are not individual.
Supposedly innocent machinery may in this way be responsible
for more of the ontology than are frankly 'empirical' primitives.

... The nominalistically minded philosopher like myself will
not willingly use apparatus that peoples his world with a host of
ethereal, platonic, pseudo entities. As a result he will so far as he
can avoid all use of the calculus of classes, and every other
reference to nonindividuals in constructing a system. 11
We found this argument persuasive, so we decided to formulate our
definitions nominalistically. Consequently we used the calculus of
individuals, 12 a nominalist form of logic developed by Goodman and
Leonard which, in contrast to standard logic, permits existential statements to be made only at the lowest level of abstraction (the level of
individuals) 13 and not simultaneously about abstract ideas. Thus state-

https://surface.syr.edu/suscholar/vol3/iss1/14

10. N. Goodman, ""A World of Individuals," in The Problem of Universals,
ed. I.M. Bochenski, A. Church, and N.
Goodman (Notre Dame, Ind.: University
of Notre Dame Press, 1956), pp. 13-31;
Goodman, Structure of Appearance,
pp. 24-33.

11. Goodman, Structure of Appearance,
pp. 25-26.

12. H.S. Leonard and N. Goodman,
"The Calculus of Individuals and Its
Uses," journal of Symbolic Logic 5
(1940):44-55.
13. Individual here means any tangible
material object or collection of objects
(object may refer to a living organism)
or any part of an individual. An individual, if it is a collection, need not be
homogeneous. That is, while a group of
people, or a group of chairs, or a group
of human legs (amputated or not) , or a
group of chair rungs (not necessarily
separate from functioning chairs) can
be an individual, so can a collection of a
chair leg, five fingers (three still on a
live hand), and a book.
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14. Connectibility of theories dealing
with conceptually adjacent fields is
desirable. It aids in the generalization of
theories.
15. This question refers to the problem
of simplicity of scientific theories. Until
recently the problem has been dealt
with in terms of the criterion of minimization of the number of axioms of a
theory (usually referred to as Occam's
razor). But some work of Nelson Goodman demonstrates that it is the minimization of the number of primitive
terms (those terms of which are constructed the definitions used in stating
the axioms) that is really the issue. See
N. Goodman, "The Test of Simplicity,"
Science 128 (1958): 1064-1069; and
"Recent Developments in the Theory of
Simplicity," Philosophy and PhenomenoloRical Research 19 (1959):429-446.
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ments like There is a sweater (a claim that a sweater exists) can be made
in nominalist logic. But in nominalist logic one cannot also say There is
a heavy (that is, that the weight of an object exists in any sense independently of the object).
Heavy refers to an idea or essence which approaches, but does not
achieve, existence when it is an attribute of an individual. On the other
hand, sweater refers to an object or individual. This heavy exists is not
the same sort of expression as This sweater exists. In contrast to
nominalist logic, standard logic admits treatment of symbols referring
to abstractions in just the same way as it treats symbols referring to
individuals. Consequently nominalists speak of standard logic as
Platonist logic, in reference to the central place in Plato's philosophy of
ideas or essences.
A byproduct of this decision to couch our definitions in nominalist
terms is that the possibility was left open, although it was remote at the
time the decision was made, of automatic proof of theorems. In principle, then, computing algorithms might be used to prove theorems.
In this second version of the system we reformulated our primitives,
reducing their number to six and nominalizing them. Using these six
primitives we have constructed 145 definitions. The new primitives are
shown in Table 1, arranged against the set of nine which were used in
the earlier version. In the second version the definitions fall into four
groups which resemble the four groups of version 1: auxiliary (36
definitions), psychological (25 definitions), sociological (50 definitions), and organization (34 definitions).
The test of a primitive basis for a formal definitional scheme should
concern itself with three questions : Can a set of terms referring to
concepts concerning a major group of phenomena be defined out of this
primitive basis? Does the above set of definitions naturally extend to
concepts concerned with related groups of phenomena? 14 Is the set of
primitives small in number relative to the number of concepts to be
defined out of it? 15

T

here is reason to believe that both sets of primitives pass all
these tests. In both versions the decision to stop constructing
definitions came not because of the difficulty of construction
but rather because it became clear that more definitions could be constructed when and as needed. Moreover we have found, when our
interests have led us there, that not only have we been able to construct
definitions for such terms as decision, cooperation, conflict, and
organization but also we can easily see how we might formulate definitions for such notions as investment or revolution, for example. And
the entire structure is built up out of six extralogical primitives (i.e., six
primitives concerned with empirical substance and not with the
apparatus of logical implication).
The decision to construct a formal lexicon for the field of organizational behavior entails a commitment to provide a lexicon in which one
could express all theoretical statements of that field (i.e., all axioms or
postulates and consequently, assuming full formalization of all theories,
all theorems dealing with any portion of that field). That is, successful
completion of this task should allow all formal scientific discourse in
the field to be conducted in a lexicon consisting of defined terms and the
primitives, plus all of logic and mathematics and other mature sciences,

7
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plus the names of individuals (i.e., elementary objects of the field), in
place of the natural language.
Paul Feyerabend asserts that the meanings of terms used in the
axioms of a theory are necessarily totally dependent on the theory
itse!f.t6 The import of this claim is that the meaning of any term used in
science is determined by the nature of the theory in which it is used.
Thus if Feyerabend were correct (and this is a matter of considerable
dispute), a given term could necessarily have different meanings in
different theories.

16. P.K. Feyerabend, Explanation,
Reduction and Empiricism, Minnesota
Studies in the Philosophy of Science
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1962), 3:28-97.

Feyerabend's argument is made with reference to terms which had
not been the object of formal definitional analysis as they came to be
used in science. In each theory in which they were used they were
clothed (explicitly in some cases, implicitly in others) with meaning
peculiar to the theory in question. But these events are matters of
history, not of necessity. Nothing prevents a formal undertaking to the
effect that term x, when used scientifically, in whatever theory, will
always be understood in a certain way-perhaps in a way consistent
with its definition in the lexicon here being discussed.
Moreover, to the extent that Feyerabend's point has real impact, it
does so most of all in reference to lexicons arising in connection with
fully formalized theories, and there are none in the social sciences. In
any case, it could be argued that the problem is one not of confinement
of a term to one theory but rather of translatability from one theory to
another. But that is an issue which can be handled within the confines of
such a definitional system as we are here describing. Moreover, to the
extent that there are organization theories, we believe our definitions
cover their major concepts and can be extended to cover the rest.

W

e set out to construct a formal lexicon which would cover
the range of concerns of a field of study, rather than a
theory. In this case we felt we had to cover individual decision behavior, cooperation and conflict between individuals, organizational structures, roles in organizations, and decision behavior in and
of organizations. Thus there was a range of complexity-from the
individual to the organization and its details-that we wished to span.
In order to do this we needed to start with a primitive base which stood
outside that range.
The six primitives of the current version of the definitional system
(version 2), their readings and their clarifications (their presystematic
understandings), are given below:

x o y may be read as x overlaps y

(Pl)

This two-placed predicate holds between a pair of individuals just in
case they have a part in commonY Note that it is with this primitive
that we make our commitment to nominalism.
Suppose xis all of the left hands of all the presidents of the United
States, and y is Theodore Roosevelt. Then the overlap of x andy is
Theodore Roosevelt's left hand. In contrast, it could be the case that one
of these individuals (x andy) is entirely a part of the other. Thus if x was
Harry Truman and y his left hand, the overlap of x andy would be
Truman's left hand; or if x andy were identical, their overlap would be
the individual (x or y). If x andy had no part in common, they would

https://surface.syr.edu/suscholar/vol3/iss1/14

17. A predicate is a term that refers to
an attribute of an individual or a relation
among individuals. In the following five
statements the italicized portions are
predicates: The sweater is red. Bill is the
father of George. This chair is stronger
than that one. This set of diamonds,
rubies, and paintings is more valuable
than this tract of land. Jane stands
between Pat and Bob. The first statement contains a one-placed predicate.
(It is an attribute of an individual.) In
the next three statements the predicate
is two-placed, and in the last statement
the predicate is three-placed. Predicates
may ben-placed, with n being any positive integer, however large. A predicate
can also be a term, which, being true of
all members of some set, is the defining
criterion of set membership.

8
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have no overlap. In that case, the overlap would be nonexistent.

Es xy may be read as xis an earlier time slice than y

(P2)

This two-placed predicate holds between a pair of time slices just in
case the first-mentioned time slice is temporarily prior to the second
mentioned. A time slice is an instantaneous cross section of the universe. That is, it is a photograph of the entire world and all the physical
objects in it at an instant of time. It has extension in three spatial
dimensions but no duration at all. P2 is the basic temporal concept of
the definition system. It makes possible the introduction of such
entities as time slices, as well as continuous sequences of time slices,
which form time intervals. Moreover, with this primitive we are able to
construct such notions as a slice part of an individual (that region of a
time slice which overlaps an individual) and an interval part of an
individual (that region of a time interval which overlaps an individual) .
To clarify a bit : A slice part of an individual is that individual's image at
an instant of time. An interval part of an individual is that individual's
existence during the interval in question. Finally, this primitive enables
us to construct such temporal relations among entities as we may require.

Morph-id xy may be read as xis morphologically identical to y(P3)
This two-placed predicate holds between a pair of individuals just in
case they satisfy all the same morphological predicates of the theoretical
language. To say two objects or individuals are morphologically identical is to say that both have the same morphological predicates . That is,
if one member of a pair of morphologically identical individuals has a
morphological predicate, then so does the other.

F

or an individual to have a morphological predicate is for that
individual to be partially described by being classified in a range.
Has an income of $100,000 a year is not a morphological predicate, since it does not refer to a range. But has an income of between
$75,000 and $119,999 is a morphological predicate.
Suppose that all possible incomes were covered by a set of nonoverlapping income ranges. With each of these is then associated a morphological predicate, forming the set of morphological predicates: low
income, middle income, and high income (associated with, say, incomes
under $13,000; $13,000-$29,999; and $30,000 and over, respectively).
Moreover let us assume that there is no other predicate in the theoreticallanguage with respect to which individuals are classified into ranges
(i.e., there is no other morphological predicate in the language). Then
two individuals are morphologically identical if they fall into the same
income range (i.e., if they both have the same predicate of low income,
middle income, or high income) .
Let us now consider a theoretical language which has these three
income predicates and three more morphological predicates: low 1Q,
middle IQ, and high IQ. Individuals are said to have these predicates on
the basis of their performance on the WeLhsler-Bellevue intelligence
test (score under 70; 70-130; above 130). If these are the only two scales
in the theoretical language which generate morphological predicates,
then two individuals are said to be morphologically identical if they

Published by SURFACE, 1982

9

84---SYRACUSE 50-IOIAR

Syracuse Scholar (1979-1991), Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [1982], Art. 14

have identical morphological predicates (and each would have exactly
two). Otherwise they are said to be morphologically distinct. In general,
two individuals are morphologically identical when one individual has
every morphological predicate that the other has, and vice versa.
The predicate content of a theoretical language must include those
predicates used in the theory constructed in that language. In order to
keep morphological identity from being too restrictive a notion with
respect to any theory, a theoretical language should contain only those
predicates used in the theory under discussion. If more than one theory is
drawn from a language pool that is largely but not entirely common to
all, then the pool should be understood to be not a language but the
collection of terms used in any of the theories under discussion. That is,
the pool should be seen as the collection of terms in the language used in
those theories. Within any given full interpretation of the system, P3
permits distinguishing those characteristics that the system counts as
morphologically distinct from any other characteristics. It does this by
enabling us to define x is morphologically distinct from w.
Con-x(p) may be read as x conduces top

(P4)

T

his one-placed predicate holds just in case x is an event such
that some true sentence about it confirms an explanans of
which p is the explanandum. 18 That is, event x conduces to
statement p if, and only if, statement p is explained by an explanation
which is confirmed by some true sentence about x. Hence, conducing
here means that the investigator is persuaded, by a true statement about
x, to accept statement p as true.
Let p be the following statement: Other things being equal, the price
level will rise. Assume that statement p is explained by the pair of
statements Ll and L2.
Ll: Other things being equal, if the national debt increases, the
quantity of money in circulation will increase.
L2: Other things being equal, if the quantity of money in
circulation increases, the price level will rise.
Suppose the following is a true statement about event x: The national
debt has increased. Then it is proper to say that x conduces top; that is,
the fact that the national debt has increased persuades the investigator
to accept statement pas true. P4 is the basic confirmation relation of the
system. Explications of such notions as causation, influence, or function,
insofar as they enter into the system, are introduced by means of this
primitive.
F-bel-(p) may be read as Individuals which have F believe that p (P5)

18. The explanans is the explanation.
The explanandum is that which the
explanation explains.

This sentence scheme is true for a given choice of statement p and,
say, predicate G, just in case the predicate F is manifest and the fact that
an individual satisfies it is accepted by the investigator as a sufficient
condition for his believing that p.
Suppose the predicate F is understood as genuflects upon entering a
Roman Catholic church, while pis the statement, The pope is the vicar
of Christ on earth. Primitive P5 would now read, Individuals who genuflect upon entering a Roman Catholic church are construed by the
investigator to believe that the pope is the vicar of Christ on earth.
This is a scheme which serves to define a particular belief (which we
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usually understand to be a mental state) by associating statements about
it with a manifest predicate. That is, in this theoretical language,
genuflection upon entering a Roman Catholic church would be seen by
the investigator as grounds for saying the individual in question
believes the pope is Christ's vicar on earth. In another more complete
language there might be several manifest predicates (e.g., in addition to
F, perhaps D, dips hand in holy water font upon entering Roman
Catholic church; C, carries rosary into church), any one of which, being
satisfied, is taken by the investigator as grounds for saying the belief is
held by the subject individual. All notions involving belief, such as the
veridical-perceived distinction and the subjective-objective distinction,
that are used in the definitional system are introduced by means of this
primitive.

Index-(F)x may be read as x satisfies an index ofF

(P6)

This one-placed predicate is true of any individual for any choice of
predicate just in case the individual satisfies an index of the predicate.
An index of a predicate is another predicate satisfied by everything
satisfying the former and by some other things besides, where there is
some theoretical justification for holding that these other things would
have F too, under appropriate circumstances.

S

uppose xis a phonograph record and R is the manifest predicate
is being played. Then Rx can be read, Phonograph record xis
being played. Consider the phonograph record y, which is not
being played: That is,y does not have the manifest predicate R. But if T
is the dispositional predicate is playable, can we say on what sort of
grounds we might be justified in saying that y has T?
We might examine the phonograph record and find that it has the
following three manifest characteristics: It appears to be well made; it
has a hole of the proper shape and size at the proper location; it is not
obviously scratched. If we define predicate C as has the phonograph
record characteristics given in the preceding sentence, then manifest
predicate C can be taken to be an index of T. Or, instead of C we might
accept manifest predicate W, is warranted by a reputable manufacturer
of phonograph records, as an index ofT. Thus there might be a multiplicity of indices of a given manifest predicate (each of which is itself a
manifest predicate).
Index- (T)x could then be read as phonograph record x satisfies an
index of playability. The grounds on which this is said could be the fact
that phonograph record x has the manifest predicate C; or the fact that
phonograph record x has the manifest predicate W or any other predicate taken by the scientist to be an index of dispositional predicate T. In
general, in establishing an index of a dispositional predicate like T, it
would seem most reasonable that an index itself be a manifest predicate.
The role of P6 in the system is to permit projections from manifest
predicates to dispositional predicates where such are required.
Of these primitives there is one which uniquely enables the system to
deal with more than social physics (i.e., with more than an account of
physical properties of social individuals and institutions) . That is, it
permits construction of definitions of concepts involving notions of
goal, purpose, intention, knowledge (including self-knowledge), expec-
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ration, and so forth. This is primitive P5, Individuals which have F
believe that p. The other five primitives are concerned with physical or
logical matters.
A central concept in our lexicon is that of purposive behavior (which
we take to be identical to decision behavior). For us, purposive behavior
is the proclivity to carry out one or more of a class of behaviors, each
different from the others, but each producing the same or a very similar
state of affairs . Thus an agent (i.e., actor) may display purposive
behavior with respect to some goal states but not with respect to others.
We speak of someone displaying K(FG)-for-Ha purposive behavior,
where F and G are predicates referring to different sorts of action, both
of which belong to the class K of actions; any member of K will
eventuate in a certain range of outcomes . K may be, for example, the
class of actions that transport a person a few miles through urban
traffic. Thus an individual may be a K(FG)-for-Ha purposive behaver,
where K(FG)-for-Ha is the selection on a morning of one (For G) of
several kinds of urban transit (K). The agent might ride in his own or a
friend's car or on a bicycle so as to get himself (a) to his office on time
(H). But the same individual may not be an L(MN)-for-]a purposive
behaver, where L is the class of actions (e.g., M and N) involved in
cooking for breakfast so as to provide the agent with a warm breakfast
(fa) . In this case, rather than doing L(MN)-for-]a, the agent munches
mechanically and absentmindedly on whatever he randomly reaches for
in his pantry while reading the morning paper. It is the morning paper
that has his purposive attention, not his breakfast.

W

hat we are saying of purposive behavior is that it is not just
action that leads to a specified state of affairs. Any simple
automaton is capable of that. A thermostatic furnace or
refrigerator control or toilet-flush mechanism does not perform purposive behavior or decision making. Rather, purposive behavior is
action that is expected to result in the attainment of the specified state
of affairs, while alternative means to that attainment are available and
known to the actor. Moreover, one can infer (in ways which are
specifiable as observational techniques are developed) that if conditions
are unfavorable and a given strategy fails, one or more of the remaining
alternatives will be selected, serially and appropriately; thus in most
circumstances there is a greater probability of successful attainment of
the goal than there would be if a smaller number of strategies were
available. The use of (FG) does not mean there are only two strategies;
F and G are specimens of the class K , which may be very large.
Moreover, we are saying that a purposive behaver is not necessarily
purposive about everything. In the example above, the agent is
behaving purposively about getting to his office on time but not about
having a good warm breakfast. He is a K(FG)-for-Ha purposive
behaver but not an L(MN)-for-]a purposive behaver. In addition, it is
possible for a nonhuman animal (e.g., bear, amoeba) or a computer
running under the proper program to be a purposive behaver with
respect to certain goals. Finally, an individual may be a K(FG)-for-Ha
purposive be haver at one time and not at another. This is probably very
common.
This notion of purposive behavior enables us to build up to cooperation (i.e., an individual acts so that his purposive behavior facilitates
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activity associated with the purposive behavior of another purposive
behaver); conflict (i.e., an individual acts so that his purposive behavior
inhibits the purposive behavior of another purposive behaver); and
teleologically neutral behavior, where neither of the above is true.
Moreover, the structure of these definitions enables us easily to distinguish between, for example, cooperative behavior of a person; intentional and unintentional cooperative behavior of a person; and mutual
and quid pro quo cooperation (where the desired states of the two
agents are different). Thus we are able to build a great many nuances of
difference into the lexicon-something that most antinomological
social scientists claim is impossible in a formal lexicon.
One attractive set of distinctions which we are now able to make
clarifies the differences between conflict, cooperation, and rivalry.
Conflict is described above. Competition is mutual conflict over the
same ends; that is, x andy are in competition with each other if xis in
K-FG-for-Ha conflict withy, andy is in K-FG-for-Hb conflict withx,
where the K, F, G, and H are the same for each of the expressions.
Rivalry is a situation in which x andy are in competition or are disposed
to be-and, in appropriate circumstances, would be. No ordinarylanguage dictionary which has come to our attention makes such clear
distinctions as these.

A:.

other interesting case has to do with the notion of revolution.
But in order to discuss this, we must first look at the treatment
of organization. Our definition of organization is quite complex and presents some difficulties whose elimination is still a concern
of ours. However, it is clear that in essence it will entail considerations
of the following sort:
An organization is a group of individuals divided into subgroups that
are functionally distinct from one another (i.e., they perform distinct
functions within the organization). Each subgroup has a goal or goals
peculiar to it. Moreover, these goals, when attained, are instrumental
for the attainment of the goal or goals of the organization. Certain
aspects of the definition of organization are concerned with ( 1) goalsof the subunits and of the organization; (2) roles performed by
members of the organization (e.g., treasurer, maintenance man, foot
soldier, membership secretary); (3) structure of relations between
roles, between functional subunits, and so forth; (4) incumbencies (i.e.,
role assignments to specific individuals) .
A reorganization is any sort of change in any of these four aspects of
the organization. Depending on which aspects change, there are at least
four major types of elementary reorganization. Since a government is a
form of organization, these comments apply to governments as well. If
the reorganization takes place without the consent of those whose
agreement is required for lawful reorganization, the reorganization is a
revolution. There are at least four sorts of revolution: If incumbencies
alone change, there is a coup d'etat. If incumbencies and structures of
relations change, there is a more sweeping sort of revolution. If these as
well as roles change, the revolution is even more substantial. If all these,
and goals, change, there is a true social revolution. Note the unlikelihood of goal change without role and incumbency change, and so forth.
A goal-change revolution is likely to entain role, structure, and
incumbency change. A role-change revolution may not entail goal
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change, but it probably involves structure and incumbency change. A
structure-change revolution may not entail change in rules and goals
but probably involves change in incumbency. A coup d'etat, however,
probably does not go beyond incumbency change. Again, detailed
examination and classification of this set of phenomena is surely
facilitated by the clarity of formal definition.
We have devoted much thought to the question of how a definitional
scheme can be applied. In general, there are two types of applications
that present themselves. One is to use the system as a means for examining, and subjecting to logical test, theories in the social sciences which
are not fully formalized. That is, we propose to examine any putative
theory in the social sciences, since there are no fully formalized social
science theories.
In this sort of application an extant body of theoretical material
would be recast in terms of these definitions; and any claims as to logical
connections among the statements comprising that body (e.g., logical
independence of axioms) would then be examined. Further, possibly
clearer, more interesting, and more powerful deductions from the
axioms might emerge. Thus in this use the definitional system might
seem a test-bed for infant theories in the social sciences. And it would in
all likelihood aid in the further formalization and development of such
theories.
The second type of application is hinted at in the preceding paragraph. Here the theorist would start from scratch in this lexicon instead
of translating into, and then further developing, extant theories in
terms of this definitional scheme. Thus the theorist would work in
these terms as the theoretical physicist does in his, rather than start out
in terms of humors or fluids, proclivities or tastes, as occurred in natural
science before Newton and is too often the case in the social sciences
now.

T

hus far we have not attempted any full-scale applications.
During the few years before Rudner's death in July 1979, we
had several ventures under discussion. They included filling in
some lacunae in the definitions, preparing a discussion in the metalanguage (i.e., the language in which the formal language is discussed)
so as to simplify moving in and out of the formal language, and developing some applications of the system.
Another line of investigation (which we pursued after 1979) goes to
the matter of mechanical (i.e., computer based) proof of theorems.
Today, in contrast to the situation in the early 1960s, there is a body of
increasingly powerful mechanical theorem provers which have been
developed by the artificial intelligence community (J.A. Robinson,
E. E. Sibert, and K. Bowen at Syracuse; R. Kowalski at Imperial College,
London University; and others) . Barrett and I are currently looking into
the possibility of making use of this computer technology to manipulate
the ferociously complex statements which would result from the use of
this lexicon in recasting extant theories or in formulating new ones.
Rudner's untimely death seriously interfered, for a while, with our
abiliity to carry forward some of our projects. However, Barrett and I
now anticipate that a major piece of work will be ready for publication
within two years. It will consist, first, of an extensive discussion of the
philosophical and scientific considerations underlying the development
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of a constructional framework for a system of definitions for the social
sciences. A second major component will be a detailed explanation and
exposition of the system itself, replete with illustrations and clarifications of the definitions. Finally, we will present a few small-scale
applications of the definitional system to social science theory.
We believe that with the appearance of this work, social scientists
will find that a new and powerful tool has become available, which
should aid in the formulation, development, and logical analysis of
social science theories. If we are correct, the social sciences will be in a
better position than heretofore to become nomological sciences, with
all the good and evil consequences, social and scientific, that may flow
from such a development.
TABLE 1 TWO VERSIONS OF PRIMITIVES
Version 2
Version 1
xoverlapsy
Time slice ....................................... . x is an earlier time slice than y
Morphological class ...................... . x is morphologically identical toy
Mechanical class ........................... ..
Physical class ................................ ..
x conduces top
Producer or potential producer
Functional class ............................ ..
Event ................................................
Probability ...................................... . (Seen as settled in logic and
mathematics)
Belief ................................................ Individuals which have F believe
that p x satisfies an index ofF
When x and y are individuals, F is any predicate and p is a
statement.
NOTE:
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